After Configuring the loopback0 interface what command can we do to see the interfaces state

Implementing the OSPF Protocol

Dale Liu, ... Luigi DiGrande, in Cisco CCNA/CCENT Exam 640-802, 640-822, 640-816 Preparation Kit, 2009

Plain Text Authentication

The first and the simplest authentication type that we will discuss is plain text authentication, which is sometimes referred to as simple password authentication. Just as the name suggests plain text authentication sends the passwords through the network as clear text.

In OSPF, simple password authentication is enabled per area, and all of the routers in the area must have the key configured to participate in routing within the area. The most obvious issue with this authentication type is that since the passwords are clear text, they can be easily obtained by a packet sniffer.

Let's take a look at how this authentication type is configured. When configuring plain text authentication there are two commands that must be executed:

1.

ip ospf authentication-key

2.

area authentication

In Exercise 7.1, you will configure plain text authentication to secure a virtual link as well as configuring the loopback interface on your router.

EXERCISE 7.1

Configuration of the Loopback Interface and OSPF Authentication

In this exercise, we will perform two configuration steps. The first step will be to configure loopback interface 0 on your router. Follow these steps to enable and configure the loopback interface.

1.

Log on to your router and enter the global config mode.

2.

At the [config] prompt type interface loopback 0 and press the Enter key on your keyboard.

3.

At the [config-if] prompt type ip address 192.168.1.2 255.255.255.255 and then press the Enter key.

4.

At the [config-router] prompt type end and press the Enter key.

The second part of this exercise will have you enable OSPF plain text authentication. Follow these steps to enable and configure plain text authentication.

1.

Log on to your router and enter global config mode.

2.

At the [config] prompt type interface Ethernet0 and press the Enter key on your keyboard.

3.

To enable OSPF authentication on this interface type ip ospf authentication-key Syngress.

4.

To configure area 0 for plain text password authentication type router ospf 2 and then press the Enter key.

5.

Next input the networks to run OSPF by typing 192.168.1.0 0.255.255.255 area 0 and then press the Enter key.

6.

And finally type in area 0 authentication and then press the Enter key.

Figure 7.3 displays the interface configuration for Router 1.1.1.1 and Figure 7.4 displays the interface configuration for Router 3.3.3.3. The images show that Router 3.3.3.3 does not have an interface in area 0 but connects virtually to area 0. This configuration makes Router 3.3.3.3 a virtual ABR, so you would enable authentication for area 0 on Router 3.3.3.3.

FIGURE 7.3. Router 1.1.1.1

FIGURE 7.4. Router 3.3.3.3

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Routing Issues

In IP Addressing & Subnetting INC IPV6, 2000

Loopback Interfaces

Another feature of IBGP is the use of loopback interfaces, which eliminate a dependency that occurs when you use the IP address of a router [the physical interface to the route]. Figure 6.14 illustrates the use of a loopback interface specified on Router2.

Figure 6.14. Specifying the loopback interface for reliable routing.

In Figure 6.14, Router1 and Router2 are both running IBGP in AS 1. If Router1 were to communicate with Router2 by specifying the IP address of the Ethernet interface 0, 1, 2, or 3 [as shown in the figure as “E” for Ethernet—E0, E1, E2, and E3], and if the specified interface is not available, a TCP connection was not possible. These two routers could not communicate. To prevent this from happening, Router1 would specify the loopback interface that is defined by Router2. When this loopback interface is used, BGP does not have to rely on the physical interface availability when making TCP connections. The following commands on both of the routers illustrate the use of specifying a loopback interface:

Routerl will specify the address of the loopback interface [201.13.145.88] of Router2 in the neighbor remote-as configuration command. The use of this loopback interface requires that Router2 also includes the neighbor update-source router configuration command in its own configuration. When this neighbor update-source loopback command is used, the source of the BGP TCP connections for this specified neighbor is the IP address of the loopback interface, and not the IP address of the physical interface.

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FortiOS Introduction

Kenneth Tam, ... Josh More, in UTM Security with Fortinet, 2013

Specifying the Source IP Address for FortiOS Originated Traffic

A FortiGate has many interfaces and, therefore, can have many source IP addresses. This can create problems in some situations. Consider a case where a large organization is using IPSec for site-to-site communication. In an environment like this, there could be multiple logging servers located at various points throughout the network. By default, when the FortiGate sends a message to local log server, it will use the IP address of the interface nearest the server. However, this means that the same device shows up in the logs under multiple IP addresses. This can make for difficulty when correlating log events. Similarly, if you use remote authentication [RADIUS, TACACS+, or LDAP], there often are hard limits on which IP addresses can request access. This provides protection to the authentication server, but means that every time an interface on the FortiGate is altered, the authentication configuration must also be changed or risk being locked out.

For most of the traffic that originates from the FortiOS, it is now possible to specify the source IP address that the device will masquerade as. You can specify any address you want, typically though, the IP address of the loopback or internal interface is used. This option is only available from the CLI and is configured within the specific service that you wish to masquerade, such as DNS, NTP, or logging. As of this writing, all traffic that originates from FortiOS can have the source IP changed except for sflow collectors and SNMP traps.

FGT # config system dns

FGT [dns] #set status enable

FGT [dns] #set source-ip

end

config system ntp

 set status enable

 set source-ip

end

config log syslogd setting

 set status enable

 set source-ip

end

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Cisco Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting Mechanisms

Eric Knipp, ... Edgar DanielyanTechnical Editor, in Managing Cisco Network Security [Second Edition], 2002

Protocol Support

RADIUS does not support the following protocols, but TACAS+ does:

AppleTalk Remote Access [ARA] protocol

NetBIOS Frame Protocol Control protocol

Novell Asynchronous Services Interface [NASI]

X.25 PAD connection

Designing & Planning…

AAA Server Protection and the Loopback Interface

Because AAA servers are critical components of any organization's security infrastructure, they need to be protected accordingly. Whether they are used for only one of the AAA services or ail three, the information they contain and the services they provide need to be protected. The AAA authentication service and data provide the mechanisms to reliably establish the identities of users connecting to the network devices or using network resources. The AAA authorization service and data provide the mechanism for ensuring that authenticated users are prevented from unauthorized access to resources. The AAA accounting service and data provide criticai usage information, especially for an ISP that uses the information for billing purposes.

Because the AAA services need to be available and the AAA data needs to be accurate, protection of the servers is critical and can be achieved using a defense-in-depth approach. In addition, hardening the platform configurations of AAA servers, firewalls or packet-filtering routers can be used to ensure that only authorized devices {valid AAA clients] communicate with servers. Because this protection is based on the IP addresses of the AAA clients, ensuring that the source IP address of AAA clients is standard and consistent can reduce the administration of the packet-filtering protection. By assigning all IP addresses used for loopback interfaces from one address block and by using the ip tacacs source-interface and ip radius source-address commands on AAA clients to use the loopback interface of AAA communications, the maintenance of the packet-filtering protection is reduced. The packet-filtering rules can be established to only allow communication with the AAA servers from the defined loopback interface block. As new devices are added, the packet-filtering rules do not need to be modified.

While this approach may not be required for small organizations, it can be effective for larger ones with complex networks [ISPs].

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vic: A Flexible Framework for Packet Video

Steven McCanne, Jacobson Van, in Readings in Multimedia Computing and Networking, 2002

Device Access

Each active session has a separate conference bus to coordinate the media within that session. But some coordination operations like device access require interaction among different sessions. Thus we use a global conference bus shared among all media. Applications sharing a common device issue claim-device and release-device messages on the global bus to coordinate ownership of an exclusive-access device.

Conference Buses are implemented as multicast datagram sockets bound to the loopback interface. Local-machine IP multicast provides a simple, efficient way for one process to send information to an arbitrary set of processes without needing to have the destinations “wired in”. Since one user may be participating in several conferences simultaneously, the transport address [UDP destination port] is used to create a separate bus for each active conference. This simplifies the communication model since a tool knows that everything it sends and receives over the bus refers to the conference it is participating in and also improves performance since tools are awakened only when there is activity in their conference. Each application in the conference is handed the address [port] of its bus via a startup command line argument. The global device access bus uses a reserved port known to all applications.

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The MPLS Label Distribution Protocol MIB [MPLS–LDP MIB]

Thomas D. Nadeau, in MPLS Network Management, 2003

4.3 Definition of Terms Used in the MIB

The MIB uses some terminology either that is not included in the Label Distribution Protocol specification or that is difficult to understand—even for those who have used the MIB for some time—in particular, the terms peer, entity, session, and hello adjacency. The terms cross-connect, insegment, and outsegment were defined in Chapter 3. Table 4.1 enumerates and defines these terms in a manner that is hopefully clear and concise. Note that, for the purposes of this chapter, we will use the term this LSR to denote the LSR on which the MIB is being run [or queried].

Table 4.1. MPLS-LDP MIB terminology.

TermDefinition
LDP peer An LDP peer is an MPLS LSR that has now, or has at some time in the past, established an LDP session with this LSR.
LDP entity An LDP entity is an instance of the LDP protocol that controls a particular label space. This instance runs on this LSR. The entity is identified by the LSR ID of this LSR plus the label space identifier and is called the LDP ID. An LDP peer will never be an LDP entity.
LDP session This is an LDP session run or running between this LSR and an LDP peer. The LDP Session Table will never contain an entry for any entry found in the LDP entity table since this refers to this LSR.
LDP hello adjacency An LDP hello adjacency represents a relationship between this LSR and some LDP peer. Hello adjacencies do not exist between this LSR and itself.

4.3.1 MPLSLdpLsrId

This object reflects the LSR's LDP identifier. This object is defined as having a type of MPLSLsrIdentifier, meaning that it consists of 4 bytes that encode the label switching router ID [LSR ID]. The LSR ID is typically the base IP address of the LSR. On some platforms, this address represents one of the loopback interfaces. This value should generally not change. If it does, it would potentially confuse an NMS, since NMS systems may wish to use this object to uniquely identify an LSR running LDP. Operators may wish to carefully regulate the configuration [or reconfiguration] of this value on devices running in their network for the reasons just stated.

4.3.2 MPLSLdpLsrLoopDetectionCapable

This object is used to indicate whether the LSR supports LDP loop detection, and which loop detection modes the LSR in question has implemented. Table 4.2 enumerates and defines each possible value that an operator's NMS or OSS might encounter when interrogating this value. Implementations are encouraged not to use the other [2] value unless they have implemented some proprietary loop detection mechanism. This should be clearly indicated in their user documentation, as well as in their MPLS-LDP MIB agent capability statement.

Table 4.2. An LSR may indicate its LDP loop detection capabilities using the MPLSLdpLsrLoopDetectionCapable.

Enumeration nameDefinition
None [1] Loop detection is not supported on this LSR.
Other [2] Loop detection is supported, but by a method other than those listed below. This may indicate that the LSR supports a vendor-proprietary or experimental loop detection mechanism.
HopCount [3] Loop detection is supported by hop count only.
PathVector [4] Loop detection is supported, but only with the path vector mechanism.
HopCountAndPathVector [5] Loop detection is supported and both hop count and path vector methods are implemented.

Individual LDP sessions cannot be configured to run loop detection that differs from the mode of loop detection that is configured globally on the LSR; therefore, all sessions must run the same initial configuration of LDP loop detection. It is certainly possible to have two different sessions running different modes of loop detection after negotiation, since one LSR might be configured for HopCountAndPathVector, but that LSR's peer is only configured for HopCount. In this case, the HopCount method will be employed. At the same time, another session might be capable of only PathVector. Since loop detection is negotiated during LDP session initialization, this value should be configured on the device before any sessions are negotiated.

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Monitoring Your Network

In Wireless Hacking, 2004

Retrieving Device Interface Information

The next Getif tab is labeled Interfaces. Click this and you'll see two empty white boxes. Now click the Start button and it will query your device for what network interfaces it supports and replace the empty boxes with [potentially] several rows of data. Figure 7.5 shows the interfaces reported by m0n0wall.

Figure 7.5. m0n0wall Interfaces Reported by SNMP

A total of seven interfaces are shown. The last three, ppp0, s10, and faith0 are all shown as down in the admin and oper columns. If your m0n0wall system is running slip or ppp, you may see different results here. Interface number 4 is the standard local loopback interface at 127.0.0.1 and can usually be ignored.

The first three interfaces are the most interesting. The Ethernet interface names are sis0 and sis1. Other systems might report eth0 and eth2. These interfaces correspond to the local and WAN Ethernet ports on the m0n0wall device. A clue for which port is which is provided by the IP address column. This column shows that one interface is 10.0.1.1 and the other interface is 69.17.112.245 [the static IP of the WAN Internet connection]. Therefore, in this example, sis0 is likely the local Ethernet port and sis1 is likely the WAN Ethernet port. The very first interface is wi0. This corresponds to the wireless radio card in the m0n0wall running at IP 10.0.0.1. On Linux-based systems, this would likely appear as wlan0 or ath0.

What have we achieved so far? Quite a lot! We're remotely querying our router, m0n0wall in this case, and seeing all the interfaces available along with some basic data about them. Be sure to use the horizontal scroll bar to see what other information is available. Some devices will report the Medium Access Control [MAC] address [sometimes referred to as the “Hardware” or “Ethernet” address] in the phys column, along with the corresponding hardware vendor.

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Draft-Rosen Multicast Virtual Private Networks

Vinod Joseph, Srinivas Mulugu, in Deploying Next Generation Multicast-enabled Applications, 2011

2.2.2.52 BGP Connector Attribute

The BGP connector attribute essentially defines a way, if required, for an NLRI destination to be forwarded over a tunnel by identifying the tunnel endpoint in the connector attribute. The BGP connector is a transitive attribute that preserves the PE router address [most certainly the loopback] across an Inter-AS boundary for all originating VPNv4 routes to ensure that the RPF check for a source address within a given mVPN will succeed. It does this by “connecting” the VPNv4 prefix of the source to the PIM Neighbor on the MDT; hence, it removes the dependence on the BGP next hop.

For Multicast VPN, the BGP connector is an optional transitive attribute that is carried in a BGP VPNv4 Update. In the local AS, this attribute has no purpose, and it will always be the same value as the next hop attribute that identifies the PE router. However, it is when MPLS-VPN Inter-AS Option B is used where one or both of the ASBRs rewrite the BGP next hop that the BGP connector is used. This is required only for Inter-AS Option B, where the BGP Next-Hop is changed.

Consider the next scenario [see Figure 2.104]. Assume Default MDT has been successfully created between PE-200 and PE-300. In the Multicast VPN solution, a PIM adjacency will be established between the two PE routers over the MDT to transport customer Multicast information. PE-300 sees 166.50.10.3 [PE-200] as its adjacency. The MVPN in PE-300 will be populated with the customer VPN routes including the address of Source [X] in AS200 by way of MP-BGP VPNv4 updates as follows:

Figure 2.104.

1.

PE-200 will send a BGP VPNv4 update to ASBR-200 with the NLRI=[X] and BGP next hop=PE-200.

2.

ASBR-200 has an eBGP session with ASBR-300; therefore, it will always rewrite the BGP next hop of any local VPNv4 route it receives to the value of its interface/loopback before passing it to ASBR-300. ABSR-200 sends NLRI=[X] and BGP next hop=ASBR-200.

3.

The behavior of ASBR-300 will depend on whether next-hop-self is set on the peering session to PE-300. If next-hop-self is not set, then the VPNv4 update for [X] will be passed as it was received with a BGP next hop of ASBR-200. In our example, the next-hop-self has been set; therefore, the BGP next hop in the VPNv4 at PE-300 update will be set to ASBR-300.

4.

This process breaks the RPF check for the Source [X] inside the MVPN [and any other source address in that VRF]. For the mVPN RPF check to succeed, the rule is that the next hop of the Source in the VRF routing table must=the PIM adjacency address. In our example, for the RPF check to succeed for X, the BGP next hop must be 166.50.10.3, and the PIM Neighbor must be 166.50.10.3. This is not the case as the PIM Neighbor is 166.50.10.3 [PE-200] but the BGP next hop for X is ASBR-300; therefore, Multicast traffic from Source X to the receiver in AS300 will be dropped.

The BGP connector attribute rectifies this problem by preserving the originating PE router address across the Inter-AS boundary as illustrated in Figure 2.105. The connector attribute is a little similar to the Originator ID attribute used by an RR, which preserves the originator of the route in the local AS; however, the Originator ID is a non-transitive attribute.

Figure 2.105.

Figure 2.105 shows that the VPNv4 updates now include the BGP connector attribute that carries the value PE-200. Because this attribute is transitive, it will be carried across the AS boundary. Therefore, the process is the same as it was in the Figure 2.104 except that the connector preserves the originating PE router across the AS boundary, whereas the BGP next hop changes to the value of the ABSR. Therefore, PE-300 receives two pieces of information relating to the VPNv4 source address; the BGP next hop is its own AS, and the originating PE router address is in the remote AS.

When PE-300 receives the update, it will use the BGP connector value [if present] in the RPF check instead of the BGP next hop. Figure 2.106 details the logic involved.

Figure 2.106.

As it is not possible to know whether a VPNv4 update will go across an AS boundary or not, every VPNv4 update in a Multicast-enabled VRF must carry the BGP connector attribute. Figure 2.107 shows the BGP connector attribute for address 192.168.2.3 [the [X] in our previous diagrams] on a VRF called VPN_RECEIVER. As you can see, the connector has the value 166.50.10.3 [PE-200] while the BGP next hop is 156.50.10.1 [which is ASBR-300]. The RPF check has been modified so that it will give precedence to the BGP Connector if present instead of the BGP next hop.

Figure 2.107. BGP connector attribute.

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Session Interception Design and Deployment

Stephen R. Smoot, Nam K. Tan, in Private Cloud Computing, 2012

WCCP redirection schemes

The WCCP redirection scheme or forwarding method determines how intercepted traffic is sent to a specific WAN optimizer. There are two different redirection schemes:

GRE redirection:

In the GRE redirection scheme, the entire intercepted packet is GRE encapsulated with the GRE header containing the routing information to the selected WAN optimizer. The WAN optimizer then decapsulates the packet for optimization.

When using GRE encapsulation for WCCP redirection, the WCCP router uses the WCCP router ID as its source IP address. The WCCP router ID is the highest loopback address on the WCCP router, or if the loopback interface is not configured, the highest address of the physical interfaces.

Since the WCCP router ID is used as the source address for packets redirected from the router to the WAN optimizer, it is also the corresponding destination address for traffic from the WAN optimizer to the router during GRE return [for more details, see the WCCP Return Schemes section].

The GRE redirection scheme allows the intercepted packets to reach the WAN optimizer even if there are multiple hops in the path between the WCCP router and the WAN optimizer. This allows the flexible placement of the WAN optimizer in cases where only L3 adjacency is provisioned.

In GRE redirection, the packet redirection is handled entirely by the router software. Therefore, the GRE redirection scheme is by default used by software routers [C7200 and Integrated Services Router] and the ASR1K.

Note:

In WCCPv2, the WCCP router ID is selected based on the highest IP address on the router or highest loopback [if configured]. The WCCP process will automatically perform this task and you cannot override it with another user-defined value. Currently, the user-configurable WCCP router ID is only supported on the ASR1K router running IOS-XE Release 3.1S, using the “ip wccp source-interface” global command.

L2 redirection:

In the L2 redirection scheme, the original Ethernet frame header is rewritten with the MAC address of the selected WAN optimizer as the destination MAC. The Ethernet frame containing the intercepted packet is then forwarded to the WAN optimizer.

The L2 redirection scheme requires L2 adjacency. In this case, WCCP router ID configuration of the WAN optimizer must reference the directly connected interface IP address of the WCCP router and not a loopback IP address or any other IP address configured on the WCCP router.

The L2 redirection is performed in hardware and is typically available on L3 switches such as the Cat6K and C7600 platforms as well as the Nexus 7000 switch.

Because L2 redirection is hardware assisted, it incurs a lower CPU utilization on the WCCP router. For this reason, L2 redirection is generally preferred over GRE redirection.

Note:

In L2 redirection, unless multicast IP addresses are used and multicast routing is enabled, the WCCP configuration of the WAN optimizer must reference the directly connected interface IP address of each WCCP router.

Note:

L2 redirection requires ingress redirection.

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Anycast and other DNS protocols

Allan Liska, Geoffrey Stowe, in DNS Security, 2016

Implementing Anycast

It is important to note that anycast is not a protocol, it is just a set of routing rules. One could implement a trivial version of anycast on a home router by adding a rule to send all traffic from, for example, 192.168.1.100 destined to 8.8.8.8 to the loopback interface. This would mean that traffic destined for 8.8.8.8 would go to different locations depending on the source IP [either to the router’s loopback interface or out to the actual IP address on the Internet]. On the Internet this is implemented with multiple BGP routes to the same IP. For example, if one were to anycast the IP 1.1.1.1 with a node in Germany and the United States, both the German and American data centers would announce a 1-hop route to that IP. The core routers in Europe would prefer to route traffic to the German data center, and vice versa for the North American backbone. A simplified diagram is shown in Fig. 11.1.

Figure 11.1. In this example, the IP 1.1.1.1 is anycast and 2.2.2.2 is unicast. Note clients from different locations will visit a different instance of 1.1.1.1 but always the same 2.2.2.2.

The simplest way to run an anycast service on the Internet is to buy the infrastructure from someone who has already set it up. Most large hosting providers do not publish price lists publicly, but they will offer the service at negotiated rates. Often times BGP routing tables will only store entries for each /24 netblock, so one would need to control at least a class C of IP address and anycast the entire range. Then routes to those IPs would need to be advertised or otherwise added to BGP tables around the Internet.12 On a private network, one would simply need to configure the routing tables on edge routers to implement the same thing. For example, one could use the same IP for the root DNS server in an enterprise with locations in New York and Berlin, and add a route on the core router in each site to send that IP to a local destination. The usual practice when setting up anycast is to use two interfaces on the server: one for the shared IP address and one specific to that host. That way one can always connect to a specific server to perform maintenance.

Anycast is becoming a popular choice for distributing services, but it has many limitations both in theory and in practice. One is that it does not provide any load-balancing guarantees. From our example, the German server will probably be busier than the American server when it is morning in the United States and the middle of the night in Germany, and anycast makes no attempt to balance those. For a service like the DNS root where both users and infrastructure are widely distributed, this just means that not all nodes will have the same level of usage at the same time.

Anycast can also create routing headaches. For example, on an internal network a host may be equally close to two different anycast nodes. Using a routing algorithm where distance is the primary factor, such as OSPF, the client may constantly flip between destinations. For DNS this usually is not a problem since it primarily uses single UDP packets and is a stateless protocol. The public Internet uses BGP for internetwork routing which tends to choose stable routes. But for a stateful application like a web site, or even for any TCP session that involved multiple packets, there is always a chance that routes will flap mid-session. The closer topologically the instances are, and the longer the sessions run, the more likely these issues are to arise. Also in all cases the routing state needs to be closely coupled with the status of the application. For example, a route should not be advertised before the application is available, and it should be withdrawn whenever the service is off-line.

Another potential problem is the “cascading failures” scenario, where a large volume of traffic going to a single node will overwhelm it, then all that traffic will be routed to the next closest node and repeat the problem. One configuration to help avoid this is to use many local nodes and a few global nodes, which can be thought of as two tiers of service. If a local node fails the clients will be directed to a more powerful global node instead of failing over to another local node. The F root server uses this configuration, with two global nodes in San Francisco and Palo Alto, and more than 30 local nodes around the world. They tend to deploy the local nodes at Internet exchange points and mark the routes as nonexportable in BGP.13

For extremely high availability, a related best practice is to avoid doing software upgrades at the same time across all nodes, and in fact to vary the version and software packages themselves at different points in the network. This is to prevent bugs from taking down the entire system. Sometimes bugs can be extremely subtle and will only manifest based on the large volume of real-world Internet traffic. This practice can be seen at large scale across the DNS root, where different providers run BIND, NSD, and Knot DNS. Of course, running different types and versions of software is much more administratively complex; this can result in human errors that are worse than the cascading software failures. Therefore it should only be attempted on critical infrastructure with a large administrative operation.

One final hurdle an administrator may encounter is that many routers employ reverse path forwarding [RPF] checks to verify that they are not forwarding traffic with a spoofed source IP. They do this by checking if the interface on which they receive a packet matches the current routing table. Specifically, the interface on which a packet is received must match the interface on which it would be sent if going back to that source IP. There are scenarios where anycast will break this assumption, since the network view from the source IP may not be identical to the view from the intermediate router. For administrators facilitating anycast traffic, the topic of RPF within multihomed networks is discussed in RFC 3704. There is not much an end user can do if an upstream router blocks anycast traffic from part of their network, other than trying to negotiate with that provider. This is another argument for leasing infrastructure that has already been set up and tested.

Anycast creates several challenges for security analysis, mostly around detecting route hijacking. For example, without anycast, one may try connecting to a service from different regions to verify they all get routed to the same place. Or, one may try tracerouting from different locations to see if the connection includes unexpected hops. On an anycast network, one would expect to see wildly different routes depending on the origin or even the current state of the network. For example, if a user in Country A connects to an anycast service that has a node in Country A, but is actually routed to an end point in Country B, is that an example of route hijacking or is it simply a time when the network in Country A was experiencing congestion? These analyses can still be accomplished by comparing many different hosts that are topologically close together, but it is more difficult than the pre-anycast scenario. DNS helps with this problem by providing an optional NSID field that can return an id number for each server. Administrators can use this to determine which server they are being routed to. Dig will provide this info with the +nsid option.

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What is the command to check how the interfaces are configured?

Use the show interfaces EXEC command to display statistics for all interfaces configured on the router or access server.

What is the show interface status command?

The show interface command displays the status of the router's interfaces. Among other things, this output provides the following: Interface status [up/down] Protocol status on the interface.

What command is used to configure interfaces router?

Configure Global Parameters.

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